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Gideon Reuveni
The Bridge, the Door, and the Cultural Economy
Approach to History
The following paper wishes to explore more closely the threefold conjunction
between history, culture and the economy. It will start with a brief overview of
different conceptualizations of the nature of this relationship suggesting that
seeing the economy as a culture might provide new ways to read history. The
potential of this turn to a cultural economy approach to history will then be
illustrated by a discussion of some aspects of my current research on so-called
Jewish economic history. But before getting to this part of the paper, I would
like to begin by briefly discussing my book Reading Germany that came to life
as a dissertation project under Moshe Zimmermann’s supervision. As I realized
after having completed this study, it was very much about this connection be-
tween history, culture, and the economy.
Culture versus the Economy
Originally Reading Germany was aimed to investigate German reading culture
before 1933. This endeavor was motivated by the dominant historiographical
approach which contrasts a cultured Germany – “the country of poets and phil-
osophers” – and a barbaric Germany – “the country of judges and executors” – in
order to assess Germany and its recent history. Investigating what, how, and why
people read was to provide new insights into German society and to lead to a
better understanding of the processes that facilitated the nazification of Ger-
many. Relying on existing research on the history of reading, I presupposed that
reading was a formative activity that shaped how people conceived their reality
and made sense of their lives. Only after embarking on my research did I start to
grasp the flaws of this so-called formative approach to reading. Beyond the dif-
ficulties finding sources that could provide interesting insights and solid evi-
dence on reading habits and reading responses of nonprofessional readers,
I began to doubt the feasibility of this approach to reading as a formative activity.
The activity of reading emerged as complex social phenomenon, encompassing
a range of cultural, political, and economic interests. Finally, I started recogniz-
ing that reading is an arena wherein an unremitting struggle is waged between
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various institutions and individuals in order to shape and determine its social
status and significance. Seeing reading as a complex activity that reflects power
relations in society had significant implications for my work. It enabled me to
recognize that the framework needed for a new approach to reading and its so-
cial context was not located in reading as an activity of encoding signs printed
on paper, but in the nexus between intellectual and material culture, or, in more
general terms, between culture and the economy. On a different, more self-re-
flective level, situating reading in the space in between culture and the economy
made me realize how my own thinking was embedded in this process of semantic
determinism, presupposing that reading had a unique status as “culture” and a
formative activity. Consequently, I began questioning the notions of culture and
the economy and was particularly intrigued by the nature of their relationship.
In terms of my own research this meant that the examination of issues sur-
rounding the nature of books as a commodity offered an excellent opportun-
ity to explore the changing notions regarding the relationships between cul-
ture and the economy. While some readers stressed the cultural quality of book
reading, positing that books are beyond all economic or material interests,
others saw books as a commodity that operated, like any other products, on the
basis of supply and demand of the marketplace. Both approaches seemed to
accept the view that the economy and culture are separate, if not antithetical,
realms. Thus, the struggle over the nature of books as either a commercial com-
modity or cultural goods emerged from this normative understanding of the re-
lationship between culture and the economy. Seeing themselves as trapped be-
tween two worlds, book traders and publishers, for example, sought ways to
come to terms with what they considered as the hybrid position of their
vocation. By adopting a conceptual framework which could be used to relate to
books as products combining cultural and economic capital alike, they hoped
to refute both economy-led and culture-led criticism of the book trade and
thereby consolidate their supposed in-between position.
The most comprehensive and meticulous attempt to provide such a concep-
tual framework can be found in the work of Gerhard Menz, head of the School
for Book Trade Studies (Seminar für Buchhandelsbetriebslehre an der Handel-
shochschule) in Leipzig. In his inaugural lecture of 1925, in which he discussed
the nature of books, Menz maintained that the perception of books as the ma-
terialization of intellectual life could not ignore the complex nature of books
as a product which combine both economic and cultural dimensions.1 Menz
1 Later a version of the speech was published as Gerhard Menz, Das Buch als Ware und
Wirtschaftsfaktor, in: Archiv für Buchgewerbe und Gebrauchsgraphik 67 (1930), 445–459. On
that speech see also Friedrich Uhlig, Zehn Jahre Seminar für Buchhandelsbetriebslehre an der
Handels-Hochschule zu Leipzig, in: Börsenblatt für den deutschen Buchhandel 102 (1935),
1053–1057.
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therefore drew attention to the fact that in the cultural sphere, and specifically
where books were concerned, what he called the “book economy” (Buchwirts-
chaft) simultaneously constituted a “culture policy” (Kulturpolitik). This special
situation also provided the background to Menz’s attempt to develop a unique
view of the link between the economy and culture – a view which he called “Kul-
turwirtschaft” or “cultural economy.”2
This view involved something of a pragmatic approach to the issue of the re-
lationship between culture and the economy. It acknowledged that the produc-
tion and consumption of cultural goods involves economic transactions and
that culture operates according to the market’s principles of supply and demand,
suggesting that these activities comprise an industry and thus might be analyzed
accordingly. Yet, viewing culture as an economic activity does not imply the re-
moval of the distinction between these realms or, for that matter, the diminish-
ing of the special position and status accorded to culture. On the contrary, ac-
cording to Menz’s cultural economy idea, increasing purchasing power and
stepping up the production and consumption of cultural goods should bolster
the special status of culture. Menz seems to recognize that it is “cultural capi-
tal,” in the Bourdieuian sense of this term that determines the status of consumer
goods. Hence one of the culture producer’s main tasks is to create demand for
their goods as cultural capital, thereby increasing their economic capital as well.
According to this approach, culture and the economy are treated as interrelated
yet distinct domains wherein the economy is understood to sustain and promote
objects and activities designated as being of cultural value.
Dealing with the debate regarding the nature of books at the beginning of the
twentieth century brought the normative dimensions of the question about the
nature of the relationship between culture and the economy to the forefront. It
suggested that this debate is not merely about the difficulties of fixing the onto-
logical status of each domain, but more significantly about the various mean-
ings assigned to the terms “economy” and “culture” and how they inform our
perception of the nexus between these realms. Thus, culture and the economy
emerged as two powerful ideas whose continued use (or eclipse) has significant
consequences for how we organize and understand the social process.
Cultural Economy
At the time that I was first coming to terms with Menz’s concept of Kulturwirt-
schaft, I was unaware that a group of some of the leading commentators on the
relationship between culture and the economy from different disciplines, such
as anthropology, sociology, media studies, and geography, had gathered for a
2 Gerhard Menz, Kulturwirtschaft, Leipzig 1933.
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special workshop at the Open University in the UK to discuss what at first
struck me as a very similar notion to Menz’s “cultural economy.”3 Both ap-
proaches seemed to reject the “binary opposition” conceptualization of the
economy and culture nexus, seeing their contribution as creating a third way
beyond this dualistic thinking. However, there are some significant differences
between Menz’s concept of Kulturwirtschaft from the end of the 1920s and the
notion of “cultural economy” at the beginning of the new millennium.
To begin with, Menz’s concept of cultural economy is much narrower than
the current one. It deals with economic aspects of what today’s scholars and
policy-makers refer to as a “creative economy,” “copyright industry” or “culture
industries” (not to be confused with culture industry) – an occupational sector
that includes individual artists and self-employed creative professionals, as well
as the activities of nonprofit cultural organizations and commercial enterprises
engaged in the applied arts.4 Moreover Menz’s conceptualization is driven by
the call to establish a positive relationship between culture and the economy. It
was informed by the approach that viewed culture and the economy as two dis-
tinct yet related domains, and sought to establish a hierarchical relationship be-
tween the two realms by giving culture primacy over the economy.
The new notion of “cultural economy” as presented in the results of the
workshop mentioned above, is much broader in scope and challenging in its
theoretical sophistication. It emerged from what Paul du Gay and Michael
Pryke, the volume’s editors, describe as the “culture turn” in social sciences.
This refers to both the increasing interest in the production of meaning as rep-
resented by the growing importance of culture, creativity, and knowledge in the
economy since the end of the twentieth century, as well as to the growing aware-
ness of the constitutive role of discourses.5 Thus instead of viewing the economy
as an ontological “other” to culture, existing prior to and hence independent of
the description of it, the turn to culture instigates a shifting of this perception.
It suggests that the subjects and the objects of the world are constituted through
the discourses used to describe them and to act upon them. Consequently for
the British school of cultural economy “doing ‘culture economy’” means acting
on the assumption that economics are performed and enacted by the very dis-
courses of which they are supposedly the cause.”6
3 On this see esp. Paul du Gay/Michael Pryke (eds.), Cultural Economy. Cultural Analysis
and Commercial Life, London 2002, but also Helmut Anheier et al. (eds.), The Cultural Econ-
omy, London 2002, and of course the Journal of Cultural Economy that is published since 2008
by Sage, London, as well.
4 For a detailed bibliography of these areas see Alan Schussman/Kieran Healy, Culture,
Creativity and the Economy. Annotated Bibliography of Selected Sources (2002), <http://www.
kieranhealy.org/files/drafts/creative-economy-bib.pdf> (15 November 2011).
5 On this see the introduction chap. of du Gay/Pryke (eds.), Cultural Economy.
6 Ibid., 6.
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Exposing the allegedly discursive nature of the economy dichotomy might
appear to be a reversal of the Marx-biased superstructure model that asserts
exactly the opposite to this concept of “cultural economy,” namely the auton-
omy of the economic domain and its primacy over culture. Yet in my view, it
would be misleading to read this concept of “cultural economy” simply as a re-
turn to a quasi Hegelian conceptualization of the supremacy of culture over the
economy. For du Gay, Pryke and their peers in the “cultural economy” project,
“cultural economy” is an analytical concept and not another normative concep-
tualization of the nature of the relationship between culture and the economy.
Thus, the “cultural economy” approach is much more radical than earlier at-
tempts to determine and fix the relationship between culture and the econ-
omy. It calls for the dismissal of this distinction altogether, a distinction that has
dominated social scientific thought for the last two hundred years or so.
To fully appreciate this shift toward a discursive understanding of the na-
ture of the relationship between culture and the economy, we ought briefly
to look back at the history of this disjuncture. In his seminal work Keywords.
A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Raymond Williams explores the changing
meanings of a set of pivotal term or keywords we use when we wish to discuss
central processes of our common lives.7 There is no need to elaborate here
on the shifting meanings and multifaceted uses of the term “culture,” which,
according to Williams, is one of the two or three most complicated words
in the English language. For Williams, it is precisely the polysemism of such
terms as “culture” as well as the other so-called keywords that makes them
into powerful ideas.
Interestingly, the term “economy” does not comprise a keyword in this con-
text. It is not clear why the “economy,” until recently, seemed to escape the kind
of critique that challenges so many other so-called keywords of modern social
discourse. In fact the use of the term “economy” as a distinct category of social
life almost seems to be beyond questioning today. Yet this use of the term as
signifying the creation and management of wealth and/or as the totality of the
relation of production, distribution, and consumption, is relatively new. As
recently as the 1920s, the second edition of Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political
Economy contained no special entry for the term economy. It used the word
only to mean “the principle of seeking to attain, or the method of attaining,
a desired end with the least possible expenditure of means.”8
Historians trace the emergence of the economy as a category in public dis-
course to the development of new concepts on human conduct and the foun-
dations of the social body that evolved in a particular time and place – eight-
eenth-century Europe. Based on Albert Hirschman’s seminal discussion of the
7 Raymond Williams, Keywords. A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, London 1976, 12.
8 Timothy Mitchell, Fixing the Economy, in: Cultural Studies 12 (1998), no. 1, 85.
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idea of an opposition between passions and interests,9 Susan Buck-Morss, for
example, argued that acknowledging “the proposition that the exchange of
goods, rather than denoting the edge of community, is capable of functioning as
the fundament of collective life necessitated the discovery that within the pol-
ity such a thing as an ‘economy’ exists.”10 Thus the translation of a new language
and imagery of nature into a vocabulary and set of metaphors for imagining
the social body insinuate that “the discovery of the economy was also its inven-
tion.”11 It was formed as a new discursive object in the context of the emergence
of the nation-state and the development of new concepts of society and the re-
lationship between people and nature.
The process of professionalization of knowledge and the development of
economics as a “science” aiming to establish the “laws” that regulate market be-
havior enhanced the approach to the economy as a self-governing realm domi-
nated by interest and rationality of means for the purpose of gaining profit.12
It is thus the nineteenth century, the age of the bourgeoisie, in which culture
played a constitutive role that witnessed the emergence of a distinct econ-
omic realm. Culture and the economy came to denote separate and contend-
ing realms. This led to different attempts to determine and regulate the relations
between these realms. Karl Marx’s superstructure model, which explained the
relationship between culture and the economy, is in this sense a salient ex-
pression of an ongoing attempt to resolve what was already by the mid-nine-
teenth century perceived as a clear division. Even Max Weber, who proposed
examining economic developments as an offshoot of cultural practices, retains
the vocabulary of “culture” and the “economy.” In the concluding section of his
famous study on The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber states
that the modern economy, i. e. capitalism, is stripped of its original religious
and ethical meaning. In what is by now one of the most quoted lines from his
work, he notes that the pursuit of wealth changed from a light cloak that can be
thrown aside at any moment to an iron cage.13
9 Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism Be-
fore Its Triumph, Princeton, N. J., 1977; idem, Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent
Essays, New York 1986.
10 Susan Buck-Morss, Envisioning Capital. Political Economy on Display, in: Critical The-
ory 21 (1995), 439, accessible online at <http://tinyurl.com/4sd2ajs> (15 November 2011).
11 Ibid. Further on this idea see also Stephen Gudeman, Economics as Culture. Models and
Metaphors of Livelihood, London 1986, and Thomas L. Haskell/Richard F. Teichgraeber (eds.),
The Culture of the Market. Historical Essays, Cambridge et al. 1993.
12 On this line of thought see especially Jerry Z. Muller, The Mind and the Market. Capital-
ism in Modern European Thought, New York 2002.
13 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Par-
sons, London 1976.
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This notion of the modern economy as an iron cage became even more
prominent in the period between the two World Wars. Thus, for example, in his
famous lecture delivered at the meeting marking the fiftieth anniversary of the
Association for Social Policy (Verein für Sozialpolitik), Alfred Weber (Max’s
brother) identified with disquiet the process of the proletarianization of intel-
lectual life. He described the vanishing of intellectuals who had a benefac-
tor (Rentenintellektuelle) and were therefore free of economic worries, and the
emergence of the working intellectuals (Arbeitsintellektuelle) who were forced
to adapt to the forces of the marketplace.14 This shift was for Weber indicative of
the move from an era in which culture was able to remain apart from all econ-
omic and commercial considerations to a period in which the economy gov-
erned everything.
This so-called economization process took many forms. For example, econ-
omic vocabulary penetrated everyday discourse in almost all major European
languages.15 Terms like division of labor, inflation, or unemployment suddenly
became critical social problems affecting the daily lives of millions of people.
The stock exchange turned into the barometer of social life.16 Paradoxically, the
failure and in some instances even the collapse of economic arrangements fa-
cilitated the creation of the economy as a new discursive object governing social
life.
This process was sustained and enhanced by the emergence of the ideological
states at the period between the wars. Liberal democracy, fascism, and commu-
nism made the economy into a central interpretive category of human conduct
and a vehicle for reform and management of society. In this period Frederick
Winslow Taylor’s ideas of scientific management took hold, and John Mayn-
ard Keynes developed his work The General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money advocating interventionist government policy to mitigate the adverse ef-
fects of economic development.17 In the interwar period, econometrics was de-
veloped, that is, the attempt to create a mathematical representation of econ-
omic processes as a self-contained and dynamic mechanism.18
But it was only after the World War II that the economy became the princi-
pal category of social life and economics the most attractive and for that matter
most “scientific” discipline outside the exact sciences. The Cold War contributed
14 Alfred Weber, Die Not der geistigen Arbeit, Munich 1923.
15 Generally on this development see, for example, Catherine Gallagher, The Body Econ-
omic. Life, Death, and Sensation in Political Economy and the Victorian Novel, Princeton, N. J.,
2006; Joseph Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft. Poetik des ökonomischen Menschen, Zürich 2004.
16 On this see, for example, Bernd Widdig, Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany, Los
Angeles, Calif., 2001.
17 Brendan Sheehan, Understanding Keynes’ General Theory, Basingstoke 2009.
18 More generally on this process of the scientification of economies see Philip Mirowski,
Against Mechanism. Protecting Economics from Science, Totowa, N. J., 1988.
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significantly to this development. Economic expansion became synonymous
not only with national interests, but also with a whole way of life.
Intellectuals of different political affiliations seemed to share the uneasiness
concerning the growing significance of the economy. Assuming a normative
and dualistic approach to the nexus between culture and the economy, many
of them pointed to the devastating effects of the economy on culture. Perhaps
the most renowned reproach of the economization process was launched by
the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. In their seminal work Dialectic of
Enlightenment Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, for example, intro-
duced the notion of a “culture Industry” as a devastating process of leveling
designed to manipulate the masses to conformity through mass production
and consumption of popular culture. According to Adorno and Horkheimer
“the idea of ‘fully exploiting’ available technical resources and the facilities for
aesthetic mass consumption is part of the economic system which refuses to ex-
ploit resources to abolish hunger.”19
A more refined and for that matter radical assault on the economization pro-
cess can be found in the more recent work of the late French philosopher and
social critic Jean Baudrillard. Today, Baudrillard observes, capital does not only
have to produce goods assuming that consumption will run by itself, “it is [also]
necessary to produce consumers […] [and] demand.”20 According to Baudril-
lard, the breakdown of the seemingly logical relationship between production
and consumption is an upshot of the overproduction of meaning, creating a
new order “which is no longer that of either production, or consumption, but
that of the simulation of both.”21 For Baudrillard, this shift towards the produc-
tion of demand represents the beginning of a new “postmodern” era in which it
is “the principle of simulation, and not of reality, that regulate social life.”22
It is, however, precisely this sense of the blurring the boundaries between
culture and the economy that gave rise to a more novel claim that economic
life is becoming “culturalized.” Best substantiated in Lash and Urry’s 1994 Econ-
omics of Signs and Space, the culturalization thesis represents an epochal claim
about the relationship between culture and the economy arguing that “Econ-
omic and symbolic processes are more then ever interlaced and interarticu-
lated.”23 The growing significance of aesthetics, lifestyle and post materialistic
values (for example environmentalism or the organic and health food move-
ments) as an economic factor, the increasing importance of nonquantifiable el-
ements such as emotions and morals in business management, and the ongoing
19 Max Horkheimer/Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, New York 1972, 113.
20 Jean Baudrillard, In the Shadow of Silent Majority, New York 1983, 27.
21 Ibid., 52.
22 Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings, Stanford, Calif., 2001,123.
23 Scott Lash/John Urry, Economies of Signs and Space, London 1994, 64.
diner_001.pod    28
08-03-15 15:19:22  -mt- mt
28 Gideon Reuveni
growth of so-called copyright and knowledge industries are only a few of the
indicators that Lash and Urry’s use to validate their culturalization thesis. Based
on this analysis theorist, Georg Franck introduced the notion of “mental capi-
talism” or the “idea-economy.” He wrote:
“Imagine how the old [Marxist] warriors would rub their eyes if they saw what has
happened to the old relationship between basis and superstructure! According to ma-
terialist doctrine, the mental superstructure is only a dependent reflex of the ma-
terial production conditions. This doctrine claimed to have put the idealist worldview,
which had been standing on its head, back on its feet. But what are those conditions
doing now? They are standing on their head out of their own accord. Idea-economy has
taken the lead.”24
To be sure, the culturalization thesis shuns any normative judgments on the re-
lations between economy and culture. Yet by asserting the increasing import-
ance of culture in economic life, it upholds the dualism between culture and
the economy. This is exactly where the cultural economy approach departs from
this version of the culturalization thesis. As explained above, cultural economy
is enacted as a post-structuralist form of analysis displaying the economy as a
cultural site, and thus refuting the culture-economy dichotomy altogether.
What the economization of culture view has in common with the more
recent approaches that point to a culturalization process of the economy, is that
both seem to share the temporal disjuncture according to which we are now
living in a time characterized by a radically different relationship between cul-
ture and the economy than in the past. For historians, however, this notion that
economic activities are immersed in or, as Karl Polanyi noted, are embedded in
normative institutional frameworks and culture practices should not be a novel
claim.25 In fact, historians like E. P. Thompson and Fernand Braudel already
noted sometime ago that the economy becomes a historical force only as it is en-
coded in culture and interpreted in experience.26
But before we can continue exploring how this approach could further
historical research, we should not shun from discussing the problems involved
in this approach. Attractive as this notion of cultural economy may be, at this
stage, at least, it still seems much too abstract and elusive. Even more problem-
24 Georg Franck, Mentaler Kapitalismus. Eine politische Ökonomie des Geistes, Munich
2005; idem, Ökonomie der Aufmerksamkeit. Ein Entwurf, Munich 2007. The quotation is from
Georg Franck, The Economy of Attention, accessible online at <http://www.t0.or.at/franck/gfe-
conom.htm> (15 November 2011).
25 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, New York 1944.
26 On this see Richard Bieranacki, Method and Metaphor after the New Cultural History,
in: Victoria E. Bonnell/Lynn Hunt (eds.), Beyond the Cultural Turn, Berkeley, Calif., 1999,
62–92, here 65f. See also Peter Temin, Is it Kosher to talk about Culture?, in: The Journal of
Economic History 57 (1997), no. 2, 267–287.
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atic for historians is the very attempt to diminish altogether the division be-
tween culture and the economy as two distinct realms. It seems that by abolish-
ing this distinction we are risking an important principle of our knowledge,
through which we organize and exert a sense of control over our world at least
since the Enlightenment.27 This last point finally points at the awkward title
of this paper, which is based on Georg Simmel’s essay Brücke und Tür (engl.:
The Bridge and the Door).28
According to Simmel, we are beings who separate what is related and who re-
late what is separate. The bridge and the door are salient manifestations of this
human inclination. The bridge, Simmel observes, connects what is otherwise
separate. The door, on the other hand, separates what is otherwise fused. By so
doing, Simmel notes, a space is unified in itself though separated from the rest
of the world. Yet the essence of the door is in its capacity to open and thereby
create a link between the human space and everything that is outside.29
With these observations Simmel provides us a useful way to think about the
different conceptualizations we discussed above, which to a large degree appear
to operate as bridges and as doors – i. e. connecting what otherwise seems sep-
arate, and separating what is otherwise unified. Yet, the bridge and the door are
more than merely a descriptive principle of our cognition. According to Simmel
“things must be separated in order to be together.”30 To wit, instead of imposing
general analytical distinctions or, on the other hand, dismissing binary opposi-
tions we might as well acknowledge that by thinking about culture and the
economy, we cannot escape building bridges and placing doors. This does not
imply that these notions are mere constructions detached from the “real world,”
but rather suggests that we should be more receptive to how these distinctions
operate and constantly negotiate the boundaries between these realms.31 His-
tory offers an excellent venue for such an endeavor.32 This can be illustrated by
the following brief discussion of the conjunction between culture, the economy
and Jewish history as they relate to four key concepts – trust, risk, circulation,
and identity.
27 Gavin Jack, After Cultural Economy, in: Ephemera 2 (2002), no. 3., 263–275.
28 Georg Simmel, Brücke und Tür, in: Der Tag. Moderne illustrierte Zeitung, no. 683, Mor-
genblatt, 15 September 1909.
29 Michael Kaern, George Simmel’s The Bridge and The Door, in: Qualitative Sociology 17
(1994), no. 4, 397–412.
30 Ibid., 408.
31 Noel Castree, Economy and Culture are Dead! Long Live Economy and Culture!, in:
Progress in Human Geography 28 (2004), no. 2, 204–226.
32 On this see also the introduction to Hartmut Berghoff/Jacob Vogel (eds.), Wirtschafts-
geschichte als Kulturgeschichte. Dimensionen eines Perspektivenwechsels, Frankfurt a. M. 2004.
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The Economy in Jewish History
The general image of the Jews is overloaded with tropes and motifs taken from
the sphere of economics. Yet, despite the centrality of economics to Jewish life
and to the image of Jews and Judaism in modern times, Jewish historiography
has generally tended to highlight religious, cultural, and political aspects of the
Jewish past more intensively than its economic features. In recent years, we have
witnessed a slow but steady change in the approach to the economy in Jewish
studies.33 This new interest in Jewish economic history seems to correspond
to the more general developments discussed above. The potential of a cultural
approach to the economy in the context of Jewish history is evident. Let us take
as an example the issue of trust, no doubt one of the basic forms of social life
and indeed a vital presupposition for the success of activities in the economic
realm.34 Was it simply utilitarian economic parameters or were confessional
and particular ethnic affiliations definitive for the trusting interactions between
business people of the same or different faiths and backgrounds? This question
is to a large degree still unaddressed by historians of Jewish history. Within this
context, the problem of access to credit is a source of exciting questions. Thus,
for example, the availability of credit in the towns of the early modern period
was tied to membership in particular corporations. Central to the honor of the
merchants in the estate society was the concept of the “merchant’s credit,” not
just in the modern sense of creditworthiness, but also representing an estate-
based reputation. A person’s creditworthiness was closely identified with his
trustworthiness. It is well known that Jews could not be members of guilds.
To what extent and in which forms they were participants in this network of
trust and confidence remains to be researched in more detail. Based on our
knowledge today, it appears that since the Jews were bound into the estate sys-
tem as a quasi-independent estate, their creditworthiness as well as their econ-
omic transactions in general were identified with their identity as Jews. This,
however, does not seem to be a peculiarity of the pre-modern period. There
is evidence that suggests, as Hannah Arendt propounds, that even into the nine-
teenth century, Jewish business people were compelled to remain Jewish to
access inheritances.
Closely associated with the complex of issues surrounding trust is the ques-
tion of the readiness of economic agents to take on risk. Jews are commonly
associated with trade and finance and regarded as particularly willing to take
economic risks even in dodgy businesses. Perhaps the most profound ex-
33 Jonathan Karp, An “Economic Turn” in Jewish Studies, in: AJS Perspectives. The Maga-
zine of the Association for Jewish Studies (Fall 2009), 8–13.
34 On the notion of trust in the economy: Tanja Ripperger, Ökonomik des Vertrauens, Tü-
bingen 1998; Ute Frevert (ed.), Vertrauen. Historische Annäherungen, Göttingen 2003.
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pression of this view regarding the allegedly special Jewish inclination to take
risks can be found in Max Weber’s idea of “adventure” or “pariah capitalism,”
which he developed as a rejoinder to Werner Sombart’s work on Jews and
modern capitalism.35 First published in 1911, Sombart presented his so-called
Judenbuch as a direct development of Weber’s earlier famous study The Prot-
estant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Yet while Sombart essentially ac-
cepted Weber’s approach to the religious sources of modern capitalism, he
claimed that everything Weber had ascribed to Puritanism was actually
rooted in and more intensively practiced by the Jews. Sombart identified the
Jews themselves, as opposed to Jewish culture or religion, as the originators
and powerhouse of modern capitalism because of their alleged anthropologi-
cal (racial) and physiological tendencies.36 Interestingly, Weber set out to de-
fend his thesis not by refuting Sombart’s stereotypical depiction of the Jewish
economic nature, which he conspicuously accepted as given, but by reproach-
ing Sombart’s concept of capitalism. According to Weber, what distinguishes
modern capitalism from its earlier forms is the shift from the mere pursuit
of profit that characterized pre-modern forms of capitalism, to a system
that seeks to increase investment by a disciplined organization of labor and
rationalization of production.37 Thus, based on Sombart’s characterisation of
the special “Jewish” form of capitalism, Weber propounds: “The Jews stood
on the side of the politically and speculatively oriented adventurous capital-
ism.”38 Unlike Puritanism, which, according to his analysis, “carried the ethos
of the rational organization of capital and labour,”39 Jewish economic ethos,
Weber argues, was motivated by purely acquisitive instincts, and thus was
traditional and not modern.
Weber explains this special nature of Jewish economic activities in the
context of the social position of the Jews as a “guest” or “pariah people.” Thus,
35 On Sombart and Max Weber see, for example, Arthur Mitzman, Sociology and Estrange-
ment. Three Sociologists of Imperial Germany, New York 1973; Freddy Raphael, Judaisme et
capitalisme. Essai sur la controverse entre Max Weber et Werner Sombart, Paris 1982; Avraham
Barkai, Judentum, Juden und Kapitalismus. Ökonomische Vorstellungen von Max Weber und
Werner Sombart, in: Menora 5 (1994), 25–38; Colin Loader, Puritans and Jews. Weber, Sombart
and the Transvaluators of Modern Society, in: Canadian Journal of Sociology 26 (2001), no. 4,
635–653.
36 Moshe Zimmermann, The Man who Preceded Sombart – Ludolf Holst, in: Nachum
Gross (ed.), Jews in Economic Life, Jerusalem 1985, 245–256.
37 Gary A. Abraham, Max Weber and the Jewish Question. A Study of the Social Outlook of
his Sociology, Urbana, Ill., 1992, esp. chap. 8. For a different view see Jack Barbalet, Max Weber
on Judaism. An Insight into the Methodology of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism, Max Weber Studies 6 (2006), no. 1, 51–67.
38 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 165.
39 Ibid.
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according to this approach, the inferior positioning of Jews in society as an
outsider minority group compelled Jews to take more risks in business than
the dominant majority in society. This interpretation emphasizes Jewish dif-
ference and marginalization as the basis for what appears as a Jewish incli-
nation to take risks. As interesting as these observations are, they are not
grounded in historical research. In fact we still know very little about Jewish
business ventures or about peoples’ perceptions of risk. Moreover, according
to Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky’s classic study Risk and Culture, the
willingness to take on risk and the fear of risk are aspects of what they regard
as a continuing “dialog on how best to organize social relations.”40 From
this perspective, risk is understood as “a joint product of knowledge about the
future and consent about the most desired prospects.”41 This implies that if
indeed Jews were more inclined to take economic risks and that they were
aware of the hazards of these ventures, they were much more embedded in
the economic and social system than previously assumed by scholars like Max
Weber.
This last point gives rise to a further central concept that might be instru-
mental for the analysis of the conjunction of culture, the economy and Jewish
history – i. e. circulation. The idea of circulation extends far beyond the bound-
aries of the mere exchange or flow of goods and money. Michel Foucault’s
renowned Archaeology of Knowledge has already established evidence of circu-
lation as a fundamental category of early modern science.42 The focus here was
the interdisciplinary discourse on the interchangeable relationship particularly
between medicine and economics. In order to broaden the field of investigation
to include social relationships and processes, Stephen Greenblatt’s formulation
of the “circulation of social energy” offers a stimulation framework to expand
this analysis beyond the archaeology of Western knowledge.43 This methodical
approach is based on the supposition that the breakdown of culture and society
occurs in different subsections between which a continuous “negotiation” and
“exchange” takes place. Through the application of such methods, one is able to
create new perspectives on social interconnections, the formation of identities,
as well as the relationships between economics and culture. What is important
to emphasize for our discussion here is that beyond the question of the form
and degree of Jewish participation in this circulation process of so-called social
energy, another no less fascinating aspect of this story is the correlation between
40 Mary Douglas/Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture. An Essay on the Selection of Techno-
logical and Environmental Dangers, Berkeley, Calif., 1983, 68.
41 Ibid., 69.
42 Further on this see Harald Schmidt/Marcus Sandl (eds.), Gedächtnis und Zirkulation.
Der Diskurs des Kreislaufs im 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2002.
43 Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations. The Circulation of Social Energy in
Renaissance England, Berkeley, Calif., 1988.
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such notions of circulation and the images of the intermediator and Wandering
Jew.44
The above somewhat rudimentary discussion of trust, risk, and circulation
suggest that closely associated with the complex of issues surrounding culture,
the economy and Jewish history is the question of group identity. Based on
Marx’s remark that “Judaism continues to exist not in spite of history, but
owing to history,”45 it was initially Marxist scholars who pointed to the connec-
tion between economic activity and Jewish identity. In an essay from 1890, the
Marxist theoretician Karl Kautsky, for instance, noted that in the premodern
period, “to be a Jew meant not only to be a member of a particular nation, but
also of a particular profession.”46 This notion of a “people-class” was enhanced
and further developed by scholars such as Ber Borochov and later Abram Leon
in his famous study on the Jewish Question, written in 1940.47 The significance
of this theory does not merely lie in the association between Jews and certain
professions, but in the finding that Jewish identity and survival is embedded in
the economic and social system.
Yet a more prevailing approach today allocates the multifaceted interaction
between the economy and Jewish identity to the minority status of the Jews.
This is, for example, how the prominent economist Simon Kuznets explains
Jewish economic distinctiveness in his influential study Economic Structure and
Life of the Jews.48 Kuznets’s groundbreaking work put the question of the “nor-
malization” of Jewish economic life, which had played a central role in the his-
tory of European Jewry since the eighteenth century, in a new light and empha-
sized the importance of economics as fundamental to the development and
perpetuation of group identity. More recently, Derek Penslar has taken up and
further developed this idea.49 For him, the connection between group identity
and economics is beyond question. This relationship applies to all minorities,
44 For an illuminating discussion on this see Kirill Postoutenko, Wandering as Circulation.
Dostoevsky and Marx on the “Jewish Question,” in: Gideon Reuveni/Sarah Wobick-Segev
(eds.), The Economy in Jewish History. New Perspectives on the Interrelationship between Eth-
nicity and Economic Life, New York 2011; Galit Hasan-Rokem, Contemporary Perspectives of
Tradition. Moving on with The Wandering Jew, in: Nicolas Berg et al. (eds.), Konstellationen.
Über Geschichte, Erfahrung und Erkenntnis. Festschrift für Dan Diner zum 65. Geburtstag,
Göttingen/Oakville, Conn., 309–331.
45 Karl Marx, The Jewish Question, accessible online at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/
marx/works/1844/jewish-question/> (15 November 2011).
46 Cited in Nathan Weinstock’s introduction to Abrahm Leon, The Jewish Question. A
Marxist Interpretation, New York 1970, 38.
47 Leon, The Jewish Question.
48 Simon Kuznet, Economic Structure and Life of the Jews, in: Louis Finkelstein (ed.), The
Jews. Their History, Culture and Religion, New York 1960, 1597–1666.
49 Derek J. Penslar, Shylock’s Children. Economics and Jewish Identity in Modern Europe,
Berkeley, Calif., 2001.
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but especially to the Jews, whose concentration in particular economic sectors
in the face of rampant modernization and secularization since the eighteenth
century provided a structural firewall against the loss of collective identity.
Given this analysis, Penslar considers the blurring of contemporary North
American Jewry’s economic distinctiveness as one of the major challenges
facing modern Jewish identity.50 These concerns call to mind similar apprehen-
sions regarding the fate of German Jews in the Weimar years. Notwithstanding
the rise of National Socialism, in the late 1920s, some prominent Jewish so-
cial scientists had already expressed serious doubt as to whether German Jewry
could retain its sense of communal identity after inflation and depression prac-
tically destroyed its distinctive social and economic fabric.51
If indeed the economy plays such a defining role in upholding Jewish distinc-
tiveness and a sense of belonging, how, if at all, can “Jewish economy” illumi-
nate economic life in general? This is another exciting question that future re-
search will need to come to terms with. It seems then that the conjunction
between culture, the economy, and Jewish history opens new and to a large ex-
tent still unexplored terrains for historical study.
50 In this context Penslar cites Edna Bonacich and John Modell’s study on the economic
basis of ethnic solidarity claiming that “when minorities become like majority economically, it is
difficult to preserve their distinctiveness.” Penslar, Shylock’s Children, 261.
51 On this see esp. Alfred Marcus, Die wirtschaftliche Krise des deutschen Juden. Eine so-
ziologische Untersuchung, Berlin 1931; Jacob Lestschinsky, Das wirtschaftliche Schicksal des
deutschen Judentums. Aufstieg, Wandlung, Krise, Ausblick, Berlin 1932. More generally on this
discourse see Donald L. Niewyk, The Impact of Inflation and Depression on German Jews,
in: Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 28 (1983), 19–36; Martin Liepach, Das Krisenbewusstsein
des jüdischen Bürgertums in den Goldenen Zwanzigern, in: Andreas Gotzmann/Rainer Liedtke/
Till van Rahden (eds.), Juden, Bürger, Deutsche. Zur Geschichte von Vielfalt und Differenz
1800–1933, Tübingen 2001, 395–418; Moshe Zimmermann, Die deutschen Juden 1914–1945,
Munich 1997.
